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INTRODUCTION

Since the mid-nineteenth century Congress has recognized
the role that federal courts may play in strengthening the legal
and diplomatic relations with other countries by assisting international tribunals in acquiring evidence located in the United
States. 1 In 1855, Congress passed the Act of March 2, 1855 (Act
of 1855), setting forth a procedure for obtaining evidence2 located within the United States for use in foreign tribunals. In
addition, Congress passed the following Acts: Act of 1863, 1948
t 2006 J.D. Candidate with a Certificate in International Law, Pace Univerof Law; B.S. in Business Management, Yeshiva University.
School
sity
1 See, e.g., Act of March 2, 1855, ch. 140, § 2, 10 Stat. 630 (1855); see also
Brian Eric Bomstein & Julie M. Levitt, Comment, Much Ado About 1782: A Look

at Recent Problems with Discovery in the United States for use in Foreign Litigation Under 28 U.S.C. § 1782, 20 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 429 (1989).
2 Id.

1

PACE INT'L L. REV.

[Vol. 17:413

and 1949. In 1958, Congress formed a commission to "investigate and study present practices in judicial assistance and judicial cooperation between the United States and Foreign
Countries, and to make recommendations for the improvement
of international legal practice and methods of procedure." 3 In
forming the commission, Congress was less concerned with
strengthening the legal and diplomatic relations with foreign
countries than it was with focusing on the expansion of business
activity between U.S. citizens and foreign nations and citizens. 4
Congress sought to further facilitate international business activity by providing legal procedures by which U.S. citizens and
foreigners could settle their disputes.5
In 1964, Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) to broaden
the scope of the statute. 6 However, rather than serving as a
bright line rule for federal courts, the statute became the subject of debate, and the source of various interpretations by different circuits. 7 In Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices
("AMD"),8 the United States Supreme Court took the opportunity to settle the conflicting interpretations of the statute by de3 Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure - Establishment,
1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5201 [hereinafter Commission Establishment].
4 See Ryan J. Earl, Tightening JudicialStandards for GrantingForeign Discoverability Requests, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 343 (1993).
5 See Commission Establishment, supra note 3, at 5201-03.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 17-20 (the Act of 1855 was superseded by
the Act of 1863. The Act of 1863 was codified under the United States Code and
renumbered 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a). See Hans Smit, InternationalLitigation Under
the United States Code, 65 COLUM L. REV. 1015, 1026 (1965) (explaining that 28
U.S.C. § 1782(a) was intended to accomplish Congress' aim of "eliminating former
uncertainties and liberalizing the assistance that may be given" to foreign tribunals and litigants). Hans Smit, a professor at Columbia University, served as Reporter to the Commission and Advisory Committee on International Rules of
Judicial Procedure.
7 See, e.g., In re Ishihara Chemical Co., 251 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir. 2001)
(holding that § 1782(a) does not require a proceeding to be pending for a litigant
seeking discovery in the United States. Rather, the proceeding must be "imminent"); see also In re Gianoli Aldunate, 3 F.3d 54, 62 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that
§ 1782(a) does not contain a foreign discoverability requirement); In re Asta
Medica, 981 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that foreign litigants requesting assistance in obtaining discovery in the United States for use in a foreign proceeding
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) must show that the information sought would be
discoverable in the foreign jurisdiction); In re Request for Assistance From Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trin. & Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1155 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that "Congress's elimination of the word pending [in § 1782(a)] almost compels
[the court] to conclude... that a pending proceeding is not absolutely necessary").
8 Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 124 S. Ct. 2466 (2004).
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fining the requirements of "interested person" and "tribunals"
set forth by the statute.9 In addition, the Court held that a proceeding need not be pending to successfully invoke § 1782(a),
nor did the statute impose a foreign discoverability requirement. 10 In its holding, the Court resolved the divergence among
the circuits as to whether a proceeding must be pending or at
least imminent to invoke the statute, and whether there is a
1
foreign discoverability requirement. " In doing so, the Court
broadened the scope of foreign discovery requests which accorded foreign litigants a powerful tool to use against U.S. liti1 2 Moreover, the decision left
gants in foreign proceedings.
domestic litigants to speculate whether a district court would
find that a request by a foreign tribunal or litigant was unduly
intrusive or burdensome.
Part II of this Note will explore the history of discovery in
the United States for use in foreign tribunals and the various
interpretations of § 1782(a), entitled "Assistance to Foreign and
International Tribunals and to Litigants Before such Tribunals,"1 3 by lower federal courts. Part III will discuss the facts,
holding and reasoning of Intel Corp. v. AMD. Part IV will provide an analysis of Intel Corp. v. AMD and demonstrate that the
United States Supreme Court correctly interpreted the statute.
Part V will conclude that, while the Court in Intel Corp. v. AMD
correctly interpreted the statute, its possible effects on domestic
litigants may compel Congress to amend the statute to include
a foreign discoverability requirement and require federal courts
to give deference to the opinions of foreign tribunals.
II.
A.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND APPLICATION OF THE STATUTE

Legislative History

In 1855, Congress passed, for the first time, an act pertain14 The Act proing to discovery for use in foreign proceedings.
vided that federal courts were permitted, upon request through
letters rogatory, to grant judicial assistance to foreign tribunals
9 See id. at 2478-79 (2004).
10 Id. at 2479, 2481; see also infra note 43, at 3789.
11 See Intel Corp., 124 S. Ct. at 2480.
12 See id. at 2484-85.
13 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2004).
14 See Act of March 2, 1855, ch. 140, § 2, 10 Stat. 630 (1855).
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and litigants in obtaining evidence located within the United
States. 15 However, due to recording and indexing errors, the
statute was omitted from the index of the federal code for several years, which left the courts powerless to exercise their
power under the statute.' 6
Eight years following the enactment of the Act of 1855,
Congress passed a second statute concerning judicial assistance
to foreign countries.1 7 Rather than expanding the scope and
reach of the Act of 1855, the Act of March 3, 1863 (Act of 1863)
severely limited the use of letters rogatory.' 8 Subsequently,
federal courts disregarded the Act of 1855 and declined to provide judicial assistance to foreign tribunals relying instead
upon the Act of 1863.19 The courts' application of the Act of
1863, however, was not left unhindered by the legislature. Congress responded by amending the Act of 1863, which was codi-

15 The Act provides in relevant part, "where letters rogatory shall have [been]
addressed, from any court of a foreign country to any circuit court of the United

States... shall be empowered to compel the witness to appear and depose in the
same manner as to appear and testify in court." Id.
16 See Harry L. Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos
and a Program for Reform, 62 YALE L. J. 515, 540 (1953).
17 See Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 95, § 1, 12 Stat. 769-70 (1863).
18 A letter rogatory is defined as "[a] document issued by one court to a foreign
court, requesting that the foreign court (1) take evidence from a specific person
within the foreign jurisdiction or serve process on an individual or corporation
within the foreign jurisdiction, and (2) return the testimony or proof of service for
use in a pending case. Bryan A. Garner, ed., BLACK'S LAw DICTIoNARY 735 (7th ed.
2000); Compare Act of March 3, 1863, § 1, 12 Stat. 769-70 with the Act of March 2,
1855, § 2, 10 Stat. 63 (the Act of March 3, 1863 added three requirements before a
request may be granted. The requirements added were (i) that the suit is for the
recovery of money or property (ii) that the requesting country must be at peace
with the United States and (iii) the foreign country requesting the aid be a party or
have an interest in the suit).
19 See, e.g., In re Letters Rogatory from Examining Magistrate of Tribunal of
Versailles, France, 26 F. Supp. 852 (D. Md. 1939) (the court denied the request for
assistance by relying on the Act of March 3, 1863 which the court interpreted to be
limited to civil rather than criminal suits); see also In re Letters Rogatory of Republic of Colombia, 4 F. Supp. 165 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) (the court denied request for
assistance for the reason that the request was not for obtaining discovery to be
used in a suit rather for investigative purposes); In re Spanish Consul's Petition,
22 F. Cas. 854 (S.D.N.Y. 1867) (No. 13,202) (the court relied upon the Act of March
3, 1863 and denied the request for assistance); Walter B. Stahr, Discovery Under
28 U.S.C. § 1782 for Foreignand InternationalProceedings, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 597,
601 (1990).
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fled under the United States Code and renumbered 28 U.S.C.
20
§ 1782(a).
The amendments of 1948 expanded the scope of § 1782(a)
by eliminating the requirement that the foreign country requesting assistance be a party or have an interest in the proceedings and by permitting judicial assistance to cover "any
civil action pending in any court in a foreign country. '21 Section
1782(a) was further broadened by the amendments of 1949.22
The 1949 amendment eliminated the word "residing" from the
statute and replaced the words "civil action" with "judicial proceeding." 23 Although the amendments of 1948 and 1949 lessened the restrictions for seeking judicial assistance in the
to
United States, Congress still desired further modifications
24
amendment.
an
passed
it
1964
in
and
1782(a),
§
After World War II, the U.S. saw a significant expansion in
international, commercial and financial activities. 25 Investments in foreign countries by U.S. businesses as well as private
citizens multiplied. 26 In addition, the United States government implemented "trade aid programs of considerable magnitude. '27 The scale of these developments was "unparalleled in
[the] history" of the United States. 28 However, the expansion of
international business activities was not accompanied by modifications to the legal procedure by which U.S. citizens and
foreign litigants could use to adjudicate their disputes. 29 Recognizing that this expansion could lead to numerous litigations
involving U.S. litigants in foreign tribunals, Congress enacted a
bill to establish a Commission on International Rules of Judi20 See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1782(a), 62 Stat. 869 (1948).
21 The Act of June 25, 1948, in relevant part, provides: "The deposition of any
witness residing within the United States to be used in any civil action pending in
any court in a foreign country with which the United States is at peace may be
taken ..."Id.
22 See Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, sec. 93, 63 Stat. 89 (1949).
23 The Act states that "Section 1782(a) of title 28, United States Code, is
amended by striking out 'residing'... and striking out.. .the words 'civil action' and
in lieu thereof inserting 'judicial proceeding.'" Id.
24 See Judicial Procedure - Litigation with International Aspects, 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3788 [hereinafter Litigation with International Aspects].
25 See Commission Establishment, supra note 3, at 5201.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.

29 See id.
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cial Procedure. 30 The Commission was created to "investigate
and study present practices in judicial assistance and judicial
cooperation between the United States and foreign countries,
and to make recommendations for the improvement of international legal practice and methods of procedure." 31
In 1964, following the submission of the Commission's proposal, Congress passed an act to amend § 1782(a).32 The primary purpose of the amendment, Congress stated, was to
"clarif[y] and liberaliz[e] existing U.S. procedures for assisting
foreign and international tribunals and litigants in obtaining
oral and documentary evidence in the United States."33 Congress hoped that the enactment would encourage foreign countries to "similarly adjust their procedures." 34 Congress
reinforced the amendments' twin aims when it stated that the
amendment to § 1782(a) was "a major step in bringing the
United States to the forefront of nations adjusting their procedures to those of sister nations and thereby providing equitable
and efficacious procedures for the benefit of tribunals and litigants involved in litigation with international aspects." 35 Unlike the Act of 1863, the legislature, through the 1964
amendment, aimed at broadening the assistance to foreign
tribunals with no intention of constricting it.36

The 1964 amendment significantly expanded judicial assistance under § 1782(a). First, discovery requests were no longer
limited to compelling testimony and statements. 37 Rather, litigants were able to request the production of documents and
other tangible evidence as well as oral testimony. 38 Second, the
words "in any court in a foreign country" were replaced with "in
a foreign or international tribunal. '39 Thus, litigants seeking
judicial assistance were no longer obliged to demonstrate that
the discovery request was for a proceeding before a conventional
30 See id. at 5202-03.
31 Id. at 5201.
32 See Litigation with International Aspects, supra note 24, at 3788.
33 Id. at 3788.
34 Id. at 3783.

35 Litigation with International Aspects, supra note 24, at 3788.
36 See id.
37 Id. at 3788.
38 Id.
39 Id.
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court. 40 A showing that a proceeding was before an administrative tribunal or quasi-judicial agency was sufficient to request
judicial assistance under the amended § 1782(a). 4 1 Third, the
provision restricting judicial assistance to countries with which
42
the United States was at peace was taken out of the statute.
43
Fourth, the word "pending" was removed from the statute.
Therefore, it was no longer required that a proceeding be pending to invoke § 1782(a). Fifth, courts were empowered upon request to grant judicial assistance to foreign tribunals or any
interested person. 44 Thus, foreign tribunals and litigants were
authorized to make their discovery requests directly to a federal
court without the need for a letter rogatory. Sixth, a court has
complete discretion in determining whether to grant or reject
discovery requests, or to "impose conditions it deems desirable. ' '45 In determining whether, and to what extent, to honor a
discovery request a court may take into consideration the nature and attitudes of the requesting government and the char46
acter of the proceedings.

See id.
See id.
42 Id. at 3789.
43 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2004) with Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646,
§ 1782(a), 62 Stat. 869 (1948) (the word "pending" was omitted from the 28 U.S.C.
§ 1782(a)).
44 The statute states in relevant part that "[tihe order may be made pursuant
to a letter rogatory issued, or request made, by foreign or international tribunal or
upon the application of any interested person." 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a).
45 Litigation with International Aspects, supra note 24, at 3788-89.
46 See id. at 3788. In 1996 Congress amended § 1782(a) to include discovery
requests for "criminal proceedings conducted before formal accusations." 1996
Amendments, Pub. L. No. 104-6, § 1342(b) (1996). Subsequent to the 1996 amendment, the statute read as follows:
The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may
order him to give his testimony or statement or produce a document or
other thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal,
including criminal investigations conducted before formal accusation . ...
The order may be made.., by a foreign or international tribunal or upon
40
41

the application of any interested person ....

A person may not be com-

pelled to give his testimony or statement or produce a document or other
thing in violation of any legally applicable privilege.

28 U.S.C. § 1782(a).
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JudicialInterpretationof § 1782(a)

It is undisputed that the 1964 amendment to § 1782(a) was
intended to expand and "liberalize" the statute. 47 However, federal courts lacked a consistent interpretation as to the extent to
which judicial assistance was permitted under § 1782(a). The
debate among courts focused primarily on two issues: (1)
whether § 1782(a) contained an implied foreign discoverability
requirement, and (2) whether the party invoking § 1782(a) was
required to demonstrate that the evidence it sought was for use
48
in a pending proceeding.
Some circuits have held that a party seeking judicial assistance under § 1782(a) must show that the evidence sought is
discoverable in the foreign forum country. 4 9 In In re Asta
Medica,50 Asta Medica and three other pharmaceutical companies 5 1 brought a patent suit in Europe against Pfizer, Inc.
While the litigation was pending in Europe, Asta Medica filed
an application under 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) requesting judicial as52
sistance in obtaining evidence located in the United States.
The magistrate judge granted Asta's request and issued a subpoena. 53 Pfizer then moved to quash the subpoena on the
ground that the information sought would not be available and
could not be used by Asta in the foreign proceeding. 54 The magistrate determined that the information was not discoverable in
47 See Litigation with International Aspects, supra note 24, at 3788.
48 See, e.g., In re Ishihara Chemical Co., 251 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir. 2001); see
also In re Bayer AG, 146 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 1998); In re Gianoli Aldunate, 3
F.3d 54, 62 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Asta Medica, 981 F.2d 1, 5-7 (1st Cir. 1992); See In
re Request for Assistance From Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trin. & Tobago, 848
F.2d 1151, 1156 (11th Cir. 1988).
49 See, e.g., In re Asta Medica, 981 at 6; see also In re Ministry of Legal Affairs
of Trin. & Tobago, 848 F.2d at 1156.
50 In re Asta Medica, 981 F.2d at 1.
51 The pharmaceutical companies were Laboratories Sarget, Dagra and Napp
Laboratories. Id.
52 See generally In re Asta Medica, 981 F.2d at 1. Plaintiffs alleged that
Pfizers' patented process of the production of doxycycline is unpatentable since the
process was in public domain prior to Pfizers' application for a patent. Plaintiffs
asserted that Pfizer derived the invention between 1971 and 1972 from
Ankerfarm, an Italian company,'while negotiating a proposed joint venture. Id.
Asta Medica sought to obtain the testimony and production of documents from a
retired employee of Pfizer which Asta Medica believed to be involved in Pfizer's
transactions with Ankerfram. Id. at 2.
53 Id.
54 Id.
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the foreign jurisdiction and granted Pfizer its motion. 5 5 The
district court reversed and held that a showing of foreign dis56
coverability was not necessary to invoke § 1782(a).
Upon review, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered two significant policy issues when determining whether
§ 1782(a) contained an implicit foreign discoverability requirement. 5 7 The court held that a ruling that foreign discoverability
was not a necessary requirement under § 1782(a) would place
U.S. litigants at a "substantial disadvantage"58 and Congress
did not intend to place domestic litigants in a more "detrimental
position than their opponents when litigating abroad." 59 In addition, it ruled that granting judicial assistance without placing
a foreign discoverability restriction allows foreign litigants to
"circumvent foreign law and procedures," 60 thereby offending
foreign tribunals. 6 1 Thus, the appellate court held that
§ 1782(a) contained an implicit foreign discoverability requirement.

62

Similarly, in In re Request for Assistance from Ministry of
Legal Affairs of Trinidad & Tobago, the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit held that a foreign discoverability requirement was necessary to successfully invoke judicial assistance
under § 1782(a). 6 3 In this case, the Court of Appeals resolved
four issues concerning the interpretation of § 1782(a). It held
that § 1782(a) did not require a proceeding to be pending prior
56

Id.
Id. at 6.

57

See id. at 5-6.

55

58 Id. at 5.
59 Id. at 5 (The court relied on the Senate Report which stated "adjust those
procedures to the requirements of foreign practice and procedure" as one of the
rationales for the 1964 amendment).
60 Id. at 6.
61 The court held that "Congress did not seek to place itself on a collision
course with foreign tribunals and legislatures, which have carefully chosen the
procedures and laws best suited for their concepts of litigation." Id.
62 In re Asta Medica, 981 F.2d at 7.
63 See In re Request for Assistance From Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trin. &
Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1156 (11th Cir. 1988). The Minister of Legal Affairs of
Trinidad and Tobago filed a request for judicial assistance in obtaining authenticated copies of bank records of Joseph Azar in connection with a criminal investigation. The district court granted the request and issued a subpoena. Id.
Subsequently, Azar filed a motion to quash the subpoena which was denied by the

district court. Id. at 1152.

9
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to granting a discovery request. 64 In addition, the court found
that the Minister of Legal Affairs, the requesting party, was an
"interested person" within the meaning of § 1782(a), 65 and that
the evidence requested for the criminal investigation was "for
use in a proceeding" within the meaning of § 1782(a). 66 Lastly,
akin to the court in Asta Medica, the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit held that judicial assistance under § 1782(a)
was limited to evidence that would be discoverable in the for67
eign country.
The holding that § 1782(a) contained a foreign discoverability requirement, however, was not unanimously accepted.
Other circuit courts, when faced with this issue, have held that
parties requesting judicial assistance under § 1782(a) were not
required to show that the evidence they sought to obtain was
discoverable in the foreign country where the proceeding was
taking place. 68 One of the leading cases on this issue is In re
Gianoli Aldunate.6 9 In that case, plaintiffs Silvia Gianoli Aldunate and Jose Miguel Barriga Gianoli requested from the
court assistance in discovery pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a). 70
In its analysis, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals first noted
the twin aims of the 1964 amendments. 7 1 It said that Congress,
in passing the amendments, intended to clarify and liberalize
64 The court noted that the word "pending" was deleted from § 1782(a) following the 1964 amendments. The court stated, 'Webelieve that Congress' elimination of the word 'pending' almost compels us to conclude the 'opposite result' - that a pending proceeding is not absolutely necessary." Id. at 1155.
65 Since the minister is legally responsible for the enforcement of the law, the
court held that the minister was an interested party under § 1782(a). Id.
66 The court found that there was evidence that showed that the information
obtained in the United States would eventually be used in a criminal prosecution
against Azar. The court held that the imminent criminal prosecution fulfilled the
condition "for use in a proceeding" as set forth by § 1782(a). Id. at 1155-56.
67 Id. at 1156.
68 See, e.g., Four Pillars Enterprises Co., LTD, v. Avery Dennison Corp., 308
F.3d 1075, 1080 (9th Cir. 2002); see also In re Bayer AG, 146 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir.
1998); In re Gianoli Aldunate, 3 F.3d 54, 62 (2d Cir. 1993).
69 In re Gianoli Aldunate, 3 F.3d at 54.
70 Id. at 55. Aldunate and Gianoli asked the court to issue a subpoena requiring Maria and Edward Foden to produce documents and appear for depositions.
The district court granted the request and denied the Fodens' subsequent motion
to quash the subpoena. On appeal, the Fodens argued that § 1782(a) implicitly
required a showing that the information sought be discoverable in the foreign
country. Id. at 55-56.
71 Id. at 57.
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the existing procedures and encourage other countries to enact
similar statutes. 72 The court then declared the long established
rule that a statute must be interpreted based on its plain meaning. 73 Applying the plain meaning interpretation to the statute,
the court held that § 1782(a) did not contain or make any reference to a foreign discoverability requirement. 74 Therefore, the
did not include an explicit
court found that the text of § 1782(a)
75
requirement.
discovery
foreign
Unable to find an explicit foreign discoverability requirement, the court then went on to determine whether § 1782(a)
contained an implicit foreign discoverability requirement. Relying on legislative history, the court was unable to find any evidence tending to show an implicit foreign discoverability
requirement. 76 It held that "if Congress had intended to impose
such a sweeping restriction on the district court's discretion, at
a time when it was enacting liberalizing amendments to the
statute, it would have included statutory language to that effect." 77 Disregarding the rationale set forth in Asta Medica,78
the court held that § 1782(a) contained neither79an explicit nor
an implicit foreign discoverability requirement.
Two other circuit courts have held that § 1782(a) lacked a
foreign discoverability requirement. In FourPillarsEnterprises
v. Avery Dennison,80 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Id. at 58.
See id. (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242
(1989)). The court noted that an exception to the plain meaning interpretation is
72

73

found in cases in which the plain meaning interpretation clearly contradicts the
intentions of the drafters. Id.
74 Id. at 59.
75 Id.
76 See id.

77 Id.
78 The court considered the rationale set forth in Asta Medica for a finding of
an implicit foreign discoverability requirement in § 1782(a). Id. at 60. It stated
that "maintaining the balance between litigants that each nation creates within its
own judicial system, preventing circumvention of foreign restrictions on discovery
and avoiding offense to foreign tribunals" were the policy considerations behind
the Asta Medica decision. Id. The court held that while the concerns considered in
Asta Medica were "legitimate policy considerations," incorporating a foreign discoverability requirement was supported by neither the plain text meaning of the
statute nor the legislative history. Id.
79 Id. at 62.
80 See Four Pillars Enterprises Co., LTD, v. Avery Dennison Corp., 308 F.3d
1075, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002).
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rejected the notion that § 1782(a) contained a foreign discoverability requirement and granted judicial assistance. 8 l Similarly,
the court in In re Bayer AG granted a request to obtain information for use in proceedings in a foreign tribunal. Declining to
accept the arguments presented by other circuits courts8 2 for
incorporating a foreign discoverability requirement, the court
held that "imposing a requirement that the materials sought be
discoverable in the foreign jurisdiction would be inconsistent
with both the letter and the spirit of the statute."8 3 The Bayer
decision clearly illustrated the clash between the circuits as to
whether § 1782(a) imposed a foreign discoverability requirement. The disagreement between the circuits, however, was not
restricted to the foreign discoverability requirement. The issue
of whether § 1782(a) required the foreign proceeding to be pending formed yet another basis for a dispute between the circuits
as to the interpretation of § 1782(a).8 4
The question of whether § 1782(a) required that a foreign
proceeding be pending arose in In re Request for Assistance from
Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago. There, the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the deletion
of the word "pending" from § 1782(a) was not a "mistake" by
Congress, but rather it was Congress' intent to permit judicial
assistance to foreign tribunals or parties for both pending and
non-pending proceedings. 8 5 Similarly, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia determined that the judicial proceeding need not be pending.8 6 Rather, the court held that the pro81 See id. at 1080. In Four Pillars Enterprises, a Taiwanese corporation
sought discovery pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) for use in the courts of the People's Republic of China and in the Republic of China-Taiwan. The district court
granted limited discovery and upon appeal, Avery argued that the request should
be denied on the grounds that the information was not discoverable in the foreign
state. Id. at 1076-77.
82 See, e.g., In re Asta Medica, 981 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1992); see also In re
Request for Assistance From Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trin. & Tobago, 848 F.2d
1151, 1156 (11th Cir. 1988).
83 See In re Bayer AG, 146 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 1998).
84 See, e.g., In re Ishihara Chemical Co., 251 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir. 2001); see
also Letter of Request from the Crown Prosecution Serv. of the United Kingdom,
870 F.2d 686, 690 (D.C. Cir. 1989); In re Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trin. & Tobago, 848 F.2d at 1155.
85 In re Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trin. & Tobago, 848 F.2d at 1155.
86 See Letter of Request from the Crown ProsecutionServ. of the United Kingdom, 870 F.2d at 691.
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7 The
ceeding must be "within reasonable contemplation."
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, however, disagreed. In
In re the IshiharaChemical Co., LTD8 8 the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit was asked to determine whether § 1782(a)
required a proceeding to be "pending."8 9 In that case, Ishihara,
a Japanese corporation, instituted an action challenging the validity of certain patents of Shipley Company, a U.S. business,
before the Japanese Patent Office (JPO).90 Ishihara sought and
was granted judicial assistance pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1782(a). 9 1 Upon appeal, Shipley argued that the evidence
sought by Ishihara could not and will not be used in the proceeding before the JPO.92 Therefore, Shipley argued, Ishihara
93
should not be permitted to seek discovery under § 1782(a). Although the court determined that § 1782(a) did not require a
proceeding to be actually pending, it did require that the proceeding be "very imminent-very likely to occur and very soon
to occur."9 4 Once more, the decision in Ishihara Chemical
demonstrated the divergence between the circuits as to the interpretation of § 1782(a).
In the years following the legislation of the 1964 amendment, further difficulties in the interpretation of § 1782(a)
arose. 9 5 Some courts reviewing judicial assistance requests
87 Id.
88 In re Ishihara Chemical Co., LTD, 251 F.3d at 120.
89 Id. at 124.
90 Id. at 125.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 123.

93 In re Ishihara Chemical Co., LTD, 251 F.3d at 123. Ishihara responded by
claiming that the evidence it sought would be used in one of two ways: Ishihara
would attempt to introduce the evidence in the proceeding pending before the JPO
or if it is unable to do so, it would institute a second proceeding where it would be
able to introduce the evidence. Id. at 124.
94 In re Ishihara Chemical Co., LTD., 251 F.3d at 125 (quotingIn re Request
for Int'l Judicial Assistance for the Federative Republic of Brazil, 936 F.2d 702,
706 (2d Cir. 1991). The court held that the JPO had completed the evidentiary
hearing. Id. at 126. In addition, under Japanese law, new evidence may not be
introduced after the evidentiary hearing is completed unless the JPO requests
such evidence. The court held that it was unlikely that Ishihara will be able to
introduce the evidence sought before the JPO. Since the use of the evidence was
not "imminent," it denied discovery. Id.
95 See, e.g., In re Ishihara Chemical Co., 251 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir. 2001); see
also In re Gianoli Aldunate, 3 F.3d 54, 62 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Asta Medica, 981
F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1992); In re Request for Assistance From Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trin. & Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1155 (11th Cir. 1988).
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were asked to determine what type of "use" constitutes "for use
in a proceeding." 9 6 Other courts were required to determine the
meaning of "foreign or international tribunal" and "interested
person" set forth by § 1782(a). 97 In Intel Corp. v. AMD, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in an attempt to end the debate
between the circuits, resolve the issues and, clarify the ambiguities that have arisen in the course of interpreting §1782(a).98
III.

A.

INTEL CORP. V.

AMD,

INC.

The Majority Opinion

Intel and AMD were worldwide competitors in the development and sale of microprocessors.99 In October 2000, AMD filed
a complaint with the Directorate-General for Competition (DGCompetition) of the European Commission.100 In its complaint,
AMD alleged that Intel had "abused its dominant position in
the European market through loyalty rebates, exclusive
purchase agreements with manufacturers and retailers, price
discrimination, and standard-setting cartels." 0 1 AMD suggested that the DG-Competition seek discovery of documents
presented by Intel in a separate case in Alabama.10 2 The DGCompetition declined to seek judicial assistance in discovery,
and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a), AMD sought judicial assistance in the discovery of the documents from the District Court
for the Northern District of California.1o3 The district court de96 See, e.g., In re Ishihara Chemical Co., LTD., 251 F.3d at 125; see also
In re
Gianoli Aldunate, 3 F.3d 54, 62 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Ministry of Legal Affairs of
Trin. & Tobago, 848 F.2d at 1155-56.
97 See, e.g., In re Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trin. & Tobago, 848 F.2d at 1155;
see also In re Gianoli Aldunate, 3 F.3d at 62 (determining whether the discovery
requested was for "proceeding in a foreign... tribunal").
98 See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 124 S. Ct. 2466, 2474
(2004).
99 See Intel Corp., 124 S. Ct. at 2474.
100 The European Commission was the executive and administrative organ of
the European Communities. Id. (citing Brief for Commission of Commission of European Communities as Amicus Curiae at 1 [hereinafter EC Amicus Curiae]). One
of the many subjects that the Commission exercised its power over is anti-competition. See id. The DG-Competition was the European Union's anti-trust law enforcer. Id. at 2475 (citing EC Amicus Curiae at 2).
101 Intel Corp., 124 S. Ct. at 2474.
102 Id. The case that AMD was referring to was Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp.,
3 F.3d 1326 (N.D. Ala. 1998).
103 Id.
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that § 1782(a) did
nied AMD's petition for discovery and held
104
discovery.
requested
AMD's
not authorize
AMD appealed the lower court's decision to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 105 After considering three significant matters, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the
case to the lower court.10 6 The court first determined that the
European Commission was, at a minimum, a body of a quasijudicial or administrative nature.107 It then held that § 1782(a)
did not require the proceeding to be pending.' 08 Lastly, the
court concluded that § 1782(a) did not contain a foreign discoverability requirement. 10 9 Therefore, AMD was not required to
show that the documents would have been discoverable in the
European Union. 110 Intel appealed the Court of Appeal's decision to the Supreme Court, which granted certiorari.1 '
The Supreme Court first decided the issue of whether the
DG-Competition qualified as a tribunal, administrative tribunal or quasi-judicial agency." 2 The rule, stated the Court, was
that a party requesting judicial assistance under § 1782(a) was
not required to show that the proceeding consisted of litigants
or parties. 1 3 A proceeding was before a tribunal if the body
hearing the proceeding "acts as a first instance decisionmaker." 14 Furthermore, a showing that a proceeding included
104

Id.

105

Id.

Intel Corp., 124 S. Ct. at 2475.
Id. at 2475-76. The court noted that the Commission was authorized to
enforce the European Union and Treaty Establishing European Community [hereinafter EU Treaty], which regulates competition. The court further noted that the
Commission's decisions were binding, enforceable through fines and penalties and
appealable to the Court of First Instance and then to the European Court of
106
107

Justice.
108 Id. at 2475.
109 Intel Corp., 124 S. Ct. at 2476.

110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 2477. The requirement that a proceeding was before a tribunal was
set forth in the text statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a). However, legislative history
shows that a proceeding need not be before a tribunal. Rather a showing that the
proceeding was before an administrative tribunal or quasi-judicial agency was sufficient. See Litigation with International Aspects, supra note 24, at 3788. It is
important to note that, in its amicus curiae, the DG-Competition told the Court
that it was not a "tribunal within the meaning of § 1782(a)." See EC Amicus Curiae, supra note 100, at 2.
113 Intel Corp., 124 S. Ct. at 2477.
114

Id. at 2472-73.
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a complainant was sufficient so long as the complainant had a
"significant procedural right."1 15 The right of the complainant
to submit information in support of its allegations and appeal a
decision may evidence that the proceeding was before a body
that qualified as a tribunal under § 1782(a). 116 The Court held
that DG-Competition's entitlement to pursue or decline to pursue a complaint, serve formal statements and objections and
make recommendations was sufficient proof that it constituted
a tribunal within the meaning of § 1782(a).11 7 In addition, the
Court held that while AMD's formal status is neither a party
nor a litigant, its status as complainant, with rights to submit
to the DG-Competition evidence in support of its allegations
and appeal the decision arrived at by the DG-Competition, further demonstrated that the DG-Competition constituted, at a
minimum, a quasi-judicial agency."18
The Court then directed its attention to Intel's argument
that AMD was excluded from seeking assistance under § 1782
(a) because, as a complainant with limited rights, it did not
qualify as a litigant, foreign sovereign or a designated agent of a
sovereign as required by the caption of § 1782(a)." 9 Disposing
of Intel's argument, the Court cautioned that the caption of a
statute "cannot undo or limit that which the [statute's] text
makes plain," and declined to read the caption as to convey any
limitations on the statute. 120 The Court defined "interested
person" to mean a person "with reasonable interest in obtaining
judicial assistance."' 2 1 It held that complainant's participation
rights such as triggering an investigation, submission of evidence for consideration and appeal qualified the complainant as
115 Id. at 2477.
116 Id.
117 Id.

118 Intel Corp. at 2477. The Court analyzed the role that the DG-Competition
played in the disposition of competition complaints. It found that the DG-Competition's "overriding responsibility was to conduct investigations into alleged violations of the European Union's competition prescriptions." The court further held
that any subsequent appeal will be held before a tribunal within the meaning of
§ 1782(a). Id.
119 Intel argued that the words "any interested person" must be limited to persons described in the caption of the statute (litigants and foreign tribunals not
complainants). Id. at 2478.
120 Id. (quoting Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 529
(1947)).
121 Intel Corp., 124 S. Ct. at 2478.
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an "interested person" within the meaning of § 1782(a) because
the complainant had a reasonable interest in obtaining judicial
assistance. 12 2 The Court held that since AMD was entitled to
those rights in the proceeding before the DG-Competition and
had a reasonable interest in obtaining assistance from the DG1 23
Competition, AMD was an interested party under § 1782(a).
Furthermore, the Court determined that the documents sought
by AMD were intended to be used in the proceedings before the
DG-Competition 2 4 and, upon appeal, in the Court of First In2 5 Thus, the Court
stance and the European Court of Justice.'
held, AMD satisfied § 1782(a)'s requirement that the evidence
in proceeding before a foreign or internasought was for use
26
tional tribunal.
While the issues of what constituted a "tribunal" or "interested person" and whether the evidence sought was "for use in a
proceeding before a foreign tribunal" were important issues in
the interpretation of § 1782(a), the split between the circuits
has primarily surrounded two other central issues: 1) whether
§ 1782(a) required a proceeding to be pending prior to the grant
of assistance and 2) whether § 1782(a) contained a foreign discoverability requirement. 2 7 In Intel Corp v. AMD, the Supreme Court first addressed the issue of whether § 1782(a)
required a pending proceeding. Intel argued that § 1782(a) re128 It conquired an imminent or pending adjudicative action.
tended that since AMD's complaint was in its investigative
stage and no adjudicative action was in progress or even immiId.
Id.
124 Id. at 2479. The Court noted that the term 'tribunal' included "investigating
magistrate, administrative and arbitral tribunals, and quasi judicial agencies, as
well as the conventional civil, commercial, criminal, and administrative courts."
122

123

Hans Smit, supra note 6, at 1026-27, nn. 71 & 73). Thus, the Court
properly determined, that the DG-Competition was a tribunal within the meaning
of § 1782(a). See Intel Corp., 124 S. Ct. at 2479.
125 Intel Corp., 124 S. Ct. at 2479. The Court held that, clearly, the Court of
First Instance as well as the European Court of Justice constituted tribunals
within the meaning of § 1782(a). Id.
126 Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a).
127 See In re Ishihara Chemical Co., 251 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir. 2001); see also
In re Bayer AG, 146 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 1998); In re Gianoli Aldunate, 3 F.3d 54,
62 (2d Cir. 1993); In re Asta Medica, 981 F.2d 1, 5-7 (1st Cir. 1992); See In re
Request for Assistance From Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trin. & Tobago, 848 F.2d
1151, 1156 (11th Cir. 1988).
128 Intel Corp., 124 S. Ct. at 2479.

Id. (quoting
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nent, AMD should not be permitted to invoke § 1782(a). 12 9 In
its analysis of the issue, the Court divided Intel's argument into
two distinct issues: 1) whether an adjudicative action was required for judicial assistance and 2) whether a requesting party
was required to show that a proceeding was pending or imminent prior to the granting of judicial assistance. 130
The Supreme Court first examined the legislative history of
§ 1782(a) to determine whether § 1782(a) required an adjudicative action. It found in the Senate Report that Congress intended for the courts to provide assistance "whether the foreign
or international proceeding or investigation is of a criminal,
civil, administrative, or other nature." 13 ' Given that the legislative history confirmed that an investigative proceeding was
sufficient to invoke § 1782(a), the Court held that an adjudicative action was not required to invoke § 1782(a).' 32
The Court then addressed the issue of whether § 1782(a)
required a pending proceeding. It found that in its 1964 amendment, Congress removed the requirement that a proceeding be
"judicial" and "pending."' 3 3 The Court then affirmed the rule
that "when Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume its
amendment to have real and substantial effect.' 34 Accordingly, the Court determined that by removing the word "pending" from § 1782(a), Congress intended that a proceeding need
not be pending for a party to request assistance under § 1782
(a).' 3 5 Furthermore, the Court relied on the legislative history
of the 1964 amendment, which showed that Congress intended
to expand the scope of assistance under § 1782(a).13 6 This, the
Court held, further demonstrated that § 1782(a) did not require
a pending proceeding. 3 7 Therefore, the Court held that
§ 1782(a) did not require the proceeding to be pending or immi-

129

Id.

130 Id.
131 Id. (quoting S. REP. No. 1580, at 9 (1964)).
132 Intel Corp., 124 S. Ct. at 2480.
133 Id. at 2479-80.
134 Id. at 2479 (quoting Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995)).
135 Id. at 2480.
136 Id.

137 Id.
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a dispositive ruling be within
nent; rather, it required merely
138
reasonable contemplation.
The last, and most significant issue that the Supreme
Court decided was whether § 1782(a) imposed a foreign discoverability requirement. Intel argued that § 1782(a) required
AMD to demonstrate that the evidence sought would have been
139 Prior to its analysis,
discoverable in the foreign jurisdiction.
the Court emphasized that § 1782(a) expressly shielded the production of privileged materials.1 40 The Court then examined
§ 1782(a) and held that there was nothing in the text of
§ 1782(a) that tended to show that the district court's order for
production was limited to material that could be discovered in
the foreign jurisdiction. 141 Subsequently, the Court looked at
the legislative history to determine whether § 1782(a) implicitly
142 The Court
contained a foreign discoverability requirement.
was unable to find any evidence in the legislative history that
indicated that Congress intended to impose a foreign discoverability requirement.1 43 Consequently, the Court held that
implicit nor an explicit foreign
§ 1782(a) contained neither 1an
44
requirement.
discoverability
Intel's argument that § 1782(a) contained a foreign discoverability requirement, however, was not limited to the text of
§ 1782(a) and its legislative history. Intel maintained that
138 Id. Compare In re Request for Assistance From Ministry of Legal Affairs of
Trin. & Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1151 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that a proceeding
need not be pending) with In re Ishihara Chemical Co., 251 F.3d 120, 125 (2d Cir.
2001) (see discussion Part II.B.) See also In re Request for Int'l Judicial Assistance
for the Federative Republic of Brazil, 936 F.2d 702, 706 (2d Cir. 1991).
139 Intel Corp., 124 S.Ct. at 2480.
140 Id. Section 1782(a) clearly states, "A person may not be compelled to give
his testimony or statement or produce a document or other thing in violation of
any legally applicable privilege." 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2004).
141 Intel Corp., 124 S. Ct. at 2480.
142 Id. at 2481.
143 Id. The Court found that the evidence showed that the district court had
complete discretion in granting a request which further demonstrated that a foreign discoverability requirement could not have been contemplated by Congress.
Id. (citing S. REP. No. 1580, at 7 (1964)).
144 Id. at 2480-81. In its holding, the Court affirmed past decisions: See In re
Gianoli Aldunate, 3 F.3d 54, 54 (2d Cir. 1993); Four Pillars Enterprises Co., LTD,
v. Avery Dennison Corp., 308 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir. 2002); In re Bayer AG, 146 F.3d
188, 193 (3d Cir. 1998). It overruled the holding in In re Asta Medica, 981 F.2d 1, 7
(1st Cir. 1992), and In re Request for Assistance From Ministry of Legal Affairs of
Trin. & Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1151 (11th Cir. 1988).
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§1782(a) contained an implicit foreign discoverability requirement by reason of two policy considerations.145 Intel asserted
that granting a discovery request to obtain evidence not discoverable under a foreign state's laws would offend foreign governments and place foreign parties in a more advantageous position than U.S. parties. 14 6 As for the argument that granting a
discovery request would offend foreign governments, the Court
held that a foreign nation's limitations on discovery within its
own territories cannot serve as a basis for a finding that it opposes aid from United States courts. 14 7 Furthermore, it held
that a foreign tribunal's reluctance to request aid from U.S.
courts may signal no resistance to the receipt of evidence gathered pursuant to § 1782(a). 14s Therefore, the Court concluded
that the policy issue of avoiding offense to foreign governments
is insignificant in a case where a foreign tribunal was willing to
accept the evidence discovered in the United States.149
The second policy consideration that the Court reviewed
was maintaining parity between the litigants.15 o In its review
of the second policy consideration, the Court held that district
courts as well as foreign tribunals were able to maintain parity
among the parties.' 5 ' First, the Court determined that district
courts were able to maintain parity by conditioning the relief
upon the requesting party's reciprocal exchange of information.' 5 2 Second, the Court held that foreign tribunals were capable of maintaining parity between the parties by placing
conditions on the information they accept. 153 Therefore, the
145 Intel Corp., 124 S. Ct. at 2481.
146 Id. These policy issues were raised and accepted in Asta Medica as valid
arguments for a finding of a foreign discoverability requirement. See supra text
accompanying notes 58-59. However, they were rejected by the court in In re Gianoli Aldunate. See supra text accompanying note 78.
147 Intel Corp., 124 S. Ct. at 2481 (citing In re Bayer, 146 F.3d at 194).
148 Id. Interestingly enough, the Commission in this case stated in its amicus
curiae briefs that it did not need or want the assistance of U.S. courts. Id. at 2484.
The Supreme Court was reluctant to accept this statement as an absolute refusal
because the Commission did not state that if the information was obtained it
would not allow AMD to present the evidence during the proceeding. Id. at 2481.
149 Id. at 2482; see also Gianoli Aldunate, 3 F.3d at 59-60 (where the court
upheld the ruling on this issue). Whereas, it abrogated the holding in In re Asta
Medica, 981 F.2d at 7.
150 Id. at 2481.
151 Intel Corp., 124 S. Ct. at 2482..
152 Id.
153 Id.
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Court held that since parity will be maintained by district
courts as well as foreign tribunals, the policy of maintaining
§ 1782(a) imparity cannot serve as grounds for a finding 5that
4
posed a foreign discoverability requirement.
Lastly, the Supreme Court emphasized that § 1782(a) authorized, but did not require, a district court to grant discovery
requests. 155 In determining whether and to what extent to
honor a discovery request, the Court held that a court "may
take into consideration the nature of the foreign tribunal, the
character of proceedings abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign government of the court or agency abroad to U.S. federal
court judicial assistance."156 In addition, a court may take into
consideration whether the request "conceals an attempt to circumvent foreign proof-gathering restrictions or other policies of
a foreign country or the United States," 157 and whether the request was unduly intrusive or burdensome on the requested
party. 5 8 In short, the Court declined to incorporate requirements into § 1782(a) that were clearly removed or existed in
neither the statute itself nor the legislative history.' 5 9 For
every assistance request, the Court held, a district court was
required to take caution to make certain that a request was a
legitimate request, 60 and for the purpose of using the evidence
obtained in a proceeding in a foreign tribunal. 16 1 Upon completion of its analysis of the case, the Supreme Court affirmed the
holding of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and remanded the
case to the lower court for further consideration utilizing the
16 2
guidelines set forth in its decision.
154 Intel Corp., 124 S. Ct. at 2481. The Court declined to accept the policy consideration of maintaining parity as a basis for a finding of a foreign discoverability
requirement. Thus, it affirmed the ruling in Gianoli Aldunate, see supra text accompanying note 78, and overruled the holding in Asta Medica. See supra text
accompanying notes 58-59.
155 Id. (citing U.K. v. United States, 238 F.3d 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2001).
156 Id. at 2483; see also Litigation with International Aspects, supra note 24, at
3788.
157 Intel Corp., 124 S. Ct. at 2483.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 2472.
160 Id. (requests that were neither used to circumvent the evidence gathering
restrictions or policies of that foreign jurisdiction or the United States nor simply
made for obtaining information from competitors).
161 Id. at 2484.
162 Intel Corp., 124 S. Ct. at 2484.
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The Dissenting Opinion

Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion and argued that
the majority's opinion expanded the scope of § 1782(a) beyond
Congress' intentions. 16 3 Justice Breyer found that in some
countries private citizens were able to ask a court to review a
criminal prosecutor's decision not to prosecute, or decisions
made by a variety of non-prosecutorial, non-adjudicative bodies. 1 64 According to the majority's opinion, Justice Breyer argued, those private citizens were able to obtain evidence from
the United States pursuant to § 1782(a) so long as they could
show that the tribunal was reviewing a decision made by a
"first-instancedecisionmaker.165 Instead, Justice Breyer proposed an interpretation of § 1782(a) that was subject to two categorical limitations. 16 6 First, if there was a serious doubt as to
the characterization of an entity as a tribunal, an entity's characterization of its own functions should be given great deference
by the reviewing court. 16 7 Second, discovery was not permitted
if "(1) [a] private person seeking discovery would not be entitled
to that discovery under foreign law, and (2) the discovery would
not be available under domestic law in analogous
circumstances "168
Application of either of the two principles would prevent
the Court from granting assistance to AMD. 169 Justice Breyer
first questioned the characterization of the DG-Competition by
163 Intel Corp., 124 S. Ct. at 2485-86.
at 2487.
165 Id. at 2486; see also supra notes 114, 117. Justice Breyer gave an example
of the problem that may arise under the majority's interpretation of § 1782(a). He
stated that, under the majority's opinion, "a British developer, hoping to persuade
the British Housing Corporation to grant it funding to build a low-income housing
development, could ask an American court to demand that an American firm produce information designed to help the developer obtain the British grant." Id.
166 Intel Corp., 124 S. Ct. at 2486. The dissent could not show that § 1782(a)
implicitly contained the proposed limitations. Id. Thus, he urged the Court to exercise its supervisory powers which allowed the Court to proscribe rules of evidence and procedure that are binding on federal courts. Id. at 2487-88 (citing
Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 146-47 (1985)).
167 Id. Justice Breyer argued that he was unable to find any reason why Congress would have intended for the courts to avoid giving any deference to the foreign entity's self-characterization.
168 Id. The dissent believed that the second limitation which allowed district
courts to consider the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will prevent "discovery battles launched by firms simply seeking information from competitors."
169 See id.
164 Id.
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the Court as a tribunal. 170 He argued that the DG-Competition
resembled a prosecuting authority that assigned the determination of whether to prosecute to non-judges. 17 ' This, Justice
Breyer argued, was a strong indication that the DG-Competition was not a tribunal. 72 Furthermore, Justice Breyer was
troubled by the Court's refusal to give deference to the European Commission's brief regarding its characterization as a
non-tribunal. In its brief as amicus curiae,173 the European
Commission told the Court that it was not a "tribunal" under
§ 1782 (a) and if the Court determined that it was a tribunal "its
ability to carry out its governmental responsibilities will be seriously threatened." 74 Justice Breyer wrote that the majority
disregarded the European Commission's opinion and held that
the DG-Competition was in fact a tribunal within the meaning
of § 1782(a). 175 Justice Breyer argued that deference should be
given to the European Commission's own opinion regarding its
characterization as a tribunal or non-tribunal. 76 He declared
that the majority, by ignoring the European Commission's opinion, incorrectly found that the DG-Competition was a tribunal
177
within the meaning of § 1782(a).
Justice Breyer further argued that applying his second lim178
iting principle would compel the majority to dismiss the case.
Justice Breyer noted that AMD could not obtain the evidence in
Europe, had it been located there, because all that AMD was
able to do was file a complaint. 179 The investigation was con170 See id.; Intel Corp. at 2487-88.
171 Id. at 2486-87. Justice Breyer failed to clarify whether an entity that lacks
judges could ever constitute a tribunal within the meaning of § 1782(a).
172 Id.

at 2487.

173 See EC Amicus Curiae supra note 100, at 1-2. The brief submitted to the
Court was on behalf of the Commission as well as the DG-Competition.
174 Intel Corp., 124 S. Ct. at 2487 (citing EC Amicus Curiae at 2).
175 Id. at 2477. Justice Breyer was concerned that by ignoring the Commission's opinion, the Court undermined the comity interest § 1782 was designed to
serve, Id. at 2487, and disregarded "the maxim that we [the Court] construe statutes so as to help the potentially conflicting laws of different nations work together
in harmony..." Id. (quoting F. Hoffmann-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S. A., 124 S.
Ct. 2359, 2366 (2004)) (internal quotation omitted).
176 Id. at 2487.
177 Id.

at 2486.

17s Id. at 2487.
179 Intel Corp. at 2487.
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ducted by the DG-Competition and not by AMD.'8 0 Furthermore, AMD, as a non-litigant, was not able to obtain the
documents in the United States since AMD did not meet the
conditions by which non-litigants may obtain the documents
that AMD sought."" Therefore, Justice Breyer concluded, that
Congress' intent may only be satisfied by interpreting § 1782(a)
to include, at a minimum, the two principle limitations
82
proposed.
IV.

ANALYSIS OF INTEL V.

AMD

Prior to analysis, it is important to emphasize two aspects
of the legislative history of § 1782(a). First, since Congress' initial legislation 8 3 in support of assisting foreign tribunals and
litigants in obtaining information located within the territories
of the United States, Congress has continuously enacted legislation to broaden the scope of this assistance. 8 4 Second, the dual
aims of the 1964 amendment to § 1782(a) were to "clarifly] and
liberaliz[e] existing U.S. procedures for assisting foreign tribunals and litigants" in obtaining evidence located in the United
States 8 5 and, Congress hoped that its legislation would encourage foreign countries to enact similar statutes.1 8 6 Bearing
in mind these two aspects, as well as the statute and its legislative history, it is evident that the Supreme Court in Intel Corp.
v. AMD correctly interpreted § 1782(a).
First, the Supreme Court defined a "tribunal" to include
any adjudicative body that "acts as a first instance decisionmaker."18 7 The Court further held that the rights of the complainant to submit to the adjudicative body information in
180 Id. AMD was restricted to filing a complaint. The investigative stage was
performed by the DG-Competition.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 2486.
183 See Act of March 2, 1855, ch. 140, § 2, 10 Stat. 630 (1855); see also supra

notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
184 The Act of March 3, 1863 was the only Act passed by Congress that restricted the assistance to foreign tribunals. See Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 95, § 1, 12
Stat. 769-70 (1863). The 1948, 1949 and 1964 amendments clearly demonstrated
Congress' intent to expand the scope of§ 1782(a). See supra notes 20, 22, 32-34 and
accompanying text.
185 Litigation with International Aspects, supra note 24, at 3788 and accompanying text.
186 Id. at 3783.
187 Intel Corp., 124 S. Ct. at 2472-73.
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support of its allegations and appeal its decision may serve as
proof that the proceeding was before a body that qualifies as a
tribunal under §1782(a).18 8 The legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended to remove the requirement that
a proceeding must be before a conventional court prior to the
granting of assistance.' 8 9 Indeed, Congress unequivocally
stated that judicial assistance extended to administrative tribunals as well as quasi-judicial agencies. 190 In addition, there is
no evidence to indicate that Congress intended to limit the assistance to adjudicative bodies that were comparable to conventional courts. Therefore, in light of the legislative history, the
Court correctly held that an adjudicative body that "acts as a
first instance decision maker" was a tribunal within the meaning of § 1782(a). 19 1
Second, prior to the 1964 amendment, § 1782(a)'s judicial
92
assistance was limited to requests made by foreign tribunals.
Congress, through its 1964 amendment to § 1782(a), extended
the reach of assistance under § 1782(a) by permitting requests
made by "any interested person."' 9 3 The Supreme Court interpreted an "interested person" to mean a person "with reasonable
' 94 It held that a cominterest in obtainingjudicial assistance."'
plainant's participation rights such as triggering an investigation, and submission of evidence for consideration and appeal
qualified the complainant as an "interested person" within the
meaning of § 1782(a).19 5 Since Congress intended to clarify and
liberalize existing U.S. procedures for assisting foreign and international tribunals and litigants, 9 6 and the lack thereof of
188 Id. at 2477.
189 Litigation with International Aspects, supra note 24, at 3788 and accompanying text. Congress removed the requirement that a proceeding must be "in any
court in a foreign country" and replaced it with "in a foreign or international tribunal." Id.
190 Id.

191 Intel Corp., 124 S. Ct. at 2472-73 (emphasis added).
192 See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1782(a), 62 Stat. 869 (1948) (the Act
allowed assistance to requests by foreign courts only).
193 Compare Act of June 25, 1948 supra note 20, with 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a),
supra note 13.
194 Intel Corp., 124 S. Ct. at 2478 (emphasis added).
195 Intel Corp., 124 S. Ct. at 2478.
196 See Litigation with International Aspects, supra note 24, at 3783. Congress
intended to liberalize the statute by expanding its scope.
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any evidence to the contrary, 197 it cannot be said that the Court
in Intel Corp. v. AMD improperly held that an interested person
denoted a person "with reasonable interest in obtainingjudicial
assistance."198
Third, judicial assistance was permissible only if the discovery requested was "for use in a proceeding in a foreign or
international tribunal."19 9 The Court held that since the DGCompetition was a tribunal within the meaning of § 1782(a)
and AMD intended to use the documents in the proceeding
before the DG-Competition, AMD's intended use constituted
"for use in a proceeding" under § 1782(a). 20 0 Furthermore, the
Court found that if AMD appealed to the Court of First Instance
or the European Court of Justice, AMD was limited to presenting evidence that was before the DG-Competition. It held that
the restriction placed on the nature20 1 of evidence that may be
presented before the Court of First Instance and the European
Court of Justice served as an additional ground for a finding
that the evidence sought was "for use in a proceeding before a
20 2
foreign or international tribunal."
On the issue of whether the evidence was "for use in a proceeding," the Court correctly held that AMD's intent to use the
evidence in the proceeding before the DG-Competition was "for
use in a proceeding" under § 1782(a). 20 3 The Court's second line
of reasoning, that the evidence is for use in a proceeding because upon appeal, AMD could only present evidence that was
before the DG-Competition, obscured the requirement of "for
use in a proceeding." The Court implied that in the event that
the DG-Competition was not a tribunal under § 1782(a), AMD
197 There is no evidence that Congress intended to restrict the assistance afforded by § 1782(a) to "litigants" or "parties." In actuality, Congress did not use
the words litigant or party in the text of the statute. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a).
This goes to indicate that Congress intended to permit assistance to persons who
were not litigants or parties per se. See Litigation with International Aspects,
supra note 24, at 3782; see also, supra notes 119-122 and accompanying text
(where the Court declined to accept Intel's argument that the word "litigant" in the
caption of § 1782(a) limited the assistance to litigants).
198 Intel Corp., 124 S. Ct. at 2478 (emphasis added).
199 Id. at 2474; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a).
200 Intel Corp., 124 S. Ct. at 2479.
201 A determination of the nature of evidence turns on whether the evidence
was presented before the DG-Competition. Id. at 274.
202 Id. at 2474.
203

Id.
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may nonetheless seek judicial assistance under § 1782(a) because AMD was entitled to an appeal and would have inevitably
used the evidence in a proceeding before an entity that qualified
as "tribunals" under § 1782(a). Furthermore, the Supreme
Court appeared to express the opinion that if AMD was unable
to present the evidence before the DG-Competition, AMD was
entitled to assistance even prior to an appeal. 20 4 While the
Court properly found that the evidence AMD sought was "for
use in a proceeding," its second premise, however, left lower
courts with ambiguities as to the interpretation of "for use in a
20 5
proceeding. ,
Fourth, the Court held that § 1782(a) did not require a proceeding to be pending or imminent. 20 6 It determined that
§ 1782(a) necessitated "a depositive ruling be within reasonable
contemplation."20 7 On this issue, legislative history does not
show Congress' motive for removing the word "pending" from
the statute. 20 8 Congress' omission of the word "pending" from
the statute and its failure to supplement it with another limiting statement could only lead to the conclusion that Congress
intended to remove the "pending" requirement from § 1782

204

The second issue is distinguishable from the first. The first issue concerns

a proceeding before a foreign entity in which the tribunal did not meet the requirements of a tribunal under § 1782(a). The second issue, however, deals with a foreign entity that was a tribunal within the meaning of § 1782(a). But the
requesting party was unable to present the evidence before the entity due to procedural issues (it is irrelevant why the requesting party was unable to present the
evidence).
205 The proper reading of the statute should be that the evidence sought must
be for use in a current proceeding. Therefore, the right to appeal to a tribunal
should not by itself entitle the requesting party to judicial assistance. Rather, the
Court should be required to determine whether the requesting party met the requirements of § 1782(a) for the current proceeding. While AMD was permitted to
seek judicial assistance under § 1782(a), it was improper for the Court to hold that
AMD was entitled to judicial assistance under its second premise. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1782(a) (the plain meaning of the statute reads "for use in a proceeding" which
leads a reasonable person to conclude that the use must be in the current
proceeding).
206 Intel Corp., 124 S. Ct. at 2480.
207 Id. (emphasis added).
208 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) supra note 13, with Act of June 25, 1948, ch.
646, § 1782(a), 62 Stat. 869 (1948) (the word "pending" was omitted from the 28
U.S.C. § 1782(a)).
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(a). 20 9 Therefore, the Court correctly held that § 1782(a) did not
impose a requirement that the proceeding be pending for a successful invocation of the statute.
Fifth, the Supreme Court held that § 1782(a) did not include a foreign discoverability requirement compelling the requesting party to show that the evidence sought was obtainable
in the foreign jurisdiction. 2 10 An examination of the legislative
history as well as the text of the statute confirms that Congress
did not intend to impose a blanket foreign discoverability rule.
Neither the statute nor its legislative history indicated that a
party seeking judicial assistance under § 1782(a) was required
to show that the evidence sought would have been discoverable
in the foreign country where the proceeding was taking
place. 2 11 Thus, the Court properly concluded that § 1782(a) did
not impose a foreign discoverability requirement. However, the
Court improperly declined to give deference to the Commission's opinion when determining whether the Commission was
a tribunal within the meaning of § 1782(a).
In its amicus curiae, the Commission stated that it was not
a "tribunal" within the meaning of § 1782(a) and if the Court
determined that it was a tribunal "its ability to carry out its
governmental responsibilities will be seriously threatened." 21 2
The Court ignored the Commission's determination of its own
characterization as a non-tribunal and held that it was a tribunal under § 1782(a). 2 1 3 The Court held that federal lower courts
should not give deference to the opinion of a foreign entity if the
foreign entity was willing to accept the evidence. 21 4 However,
209 See Intel Corp., 124 S. Ct. at 2479-80; see also In re Request for Assistance
From Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trin. & Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151, 1151 (1 1th Cir.
1988).
210 Intel Corp., 124 S. Ct. at 2480-81.
211 There is nothing in the text of the statute to indicate that § 1782(a) contained a foreign discoverability requirement. The only indication that such a requirement existed is in the legislative history which states that Congress hoped
that by enacting the 1964 amendment, foreign countries will enact similar statutes. See Litigation with International Aspects text accompanying note 32. This,
however, cannot serve as a basis for finding a foreign discoverability requirement
since it clearly shows that Congress hoped that other countries would follow suit.
It did not, however, limit the assistance to countries that actually enact similar
statutes. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2004).
212 Intel Corp., 124 S. Ct. at 2487 (citing EC Amicus Curiae at 2).
213 Id. at 2487.
214 Id. at 2484.
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federal lower courts should give deference to a foreign entity's
opinion if the entity indicated that it will not accept the evi2 15 Deference should be
dence obtained pursuant to § 1782(a).

given to an entity's opinion so long as a foreign entity declined
to accept the evidence and the requesting party did not intend
to appeal a foreign entity's decision not to accept the evidence. 216 Should a requesting party indicate that it intended to
appeal a foreign entity's decision, the Court held, federal lower
decline to give deference to a foreign entity's
courts should
217
opinion.
The Court's ruling that deference should not be given unless a foreign entity declines to accept the evidence and the requesting party did not intend to appeal the foreign entity's
decision offends foreign courts and governments. Federal lower
courts should be permitted to consider a foreign entity's opinion
regarding the entity's own characterization as a tribunal or
non-tribunal. Permitting federal lower courts to give some deference to a foreign entity's opinion reduces the risk of U.S.
courts offending foreign tribunals and governments and, prointended in its enactment of
motes Congress' aim of reciprocity218
the 1964 amendment to §1782(a).
Lastly, the Court's decision with regards to the policy consideration of maintaining parity among litigants placed foreign
countries and tribunals in a detrimental position. The Court
assigned the duty of maintaining parity to district courts and
foreign tribunals. 21 9 The Court held that a district court may
maintain parity between the parties by conditioning the relief it
grants. 220 In addition, the Court held that foreign tribunals
may play a role in maintaining parity by placing limitations on
the evidence they accept. 221 This holding, however, required
215

Id.

at 2479. An entity's refusal to admit evidence raises the question of

whether a foreign tribunal's refusal to accept evidence obtained in the US prevents
the requesting party from obtaining judicial assistance because it was clear that it
was not "for use in a proceeding."
216 Id.

at 2478.

217 Id.
218 The concern was that offending foreign countries will prevent them from
enacting statutes similar to § 1782(a). See Litigation with International Aspects,
supra note 24, at 3783.
219 Intel Corp., 124 S. Ct. at 2482.
220 Id.
221 Id.
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foreign tribunals to discriminate between litigants, 22 2 or in the
alternative, foreign countries to alter their rules of evidence. 223
Delegation of the task of maintaining parity between litigants
to foreign tribunals will directly collide with Congress' intent in
passing the 1964 amendment: encouraging foreign countries to
4
enact similar laws. 2 2
While the Supreme Court's interpretation of § 1782(a) was
accurate, a more careful consideration of policy issues would
have been appropriate. 2 25 Deference should be given to a foreign entity's determination of its characterization as tribunal or
non-tribunal. 22 6 In addition, federal lower courts must pay
careful attention to the impact that its characterization of a foreign entity may cause on the entity. 22 7 Furthermore, although
a foreign entity's reluctance to seek assistance should not determine the outcome of a federal court's determination of whether
to grant assistance, federal courts must take into account a foreign entity's motive for declining to seek assistance. Lastly, the

222 The Court requested from foreign tribunals to maintain parity by conditioning their acceptance of evidence. Id. In some instances, the Court asked foreign
tribunals to limit their acceptance of evidence obtained pursuant to § 1782(a).
Therefore, if a party obtained evidence pursuant to § 1782(a), it exposed itself to a
risk that the foreign tribunal would decline to accept the evidence. However, had
the party obtained the same evidence from another source the evidence would be
admissible. This policy creates the possibility of discrimination between a litigant
who obtains the evidence pursuant to § 1782(a) and a litigant who obtains the
same evidence by other means.
223 Foreign countries may be required to alter their rules of evidence to differentiate between evidence obtained pursuant to § 1782(a) and other methods of obtaining evidence as to avoid discrimination between litigants in similar situations.
Note that the only difference is that one received evidence pursuant to § 1782(a).
224 The Court's policy may create resentment against U.S. courts. In such a
case, it will be unlikely that foreign countries will enact similar laws as the United
States. See Litigation with International Aspects, supra note 24, at 3783.
225 Although the Court disregarded the Commission's opinion, it
is important
to note the rationale behind the Court's decision. The Court seemed to express the
opinion that giving deference to foreign tribunals' opinions was akin to permitting
foreign tribunals to interpret § 1782(a). Interpreting § 1782(a), the Court indicated, was assigned solely to federal, not foreign courts.
226 Giving deference to a foreign tribunal's determination of its status will further the goal of Congress: to encourage foreign countries to enact similar laws.
227 If federal lower courts work in concert with foreign tribunals, foreign countries will be more likely to enact similar laws to assist U.S. litigants in litigating
claims against foreign litigants in U.S. Courts.
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solely to federal
task of maintaining parity should be delegated
228
lower courts and not foreign entities.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) to permit a district court, through its discretionary powers, to grant
assistance in obtaining evidence located within the territories of
the United States to foreign and international tribunals and
any person with reasonable interest in obtaining judicial assistance, for use in a proceeding before an adjudicative body acting
as a first-instance decision-maker. The Court further held that
28 U.S.C. § 1782(a) did not require a pending proceeding; rather
only that a dispositive ruling be within reasonable contemplation. Nor did § 1782(a) require a showing that the evidence
sought would have been discoverable in the foreign country.
The Intel Corp. v. AMC decision considerably broadened
the availability of discovery in aid of foreign proceedings. For
foreign litigants, the decision has given them a powerful tool in
obtaining evidence located in the United States. In contrast, for
U.S. litigants, the decision has exposed them to the possibility
of numerous intrusive and burdensome discovery requests by
competitors, and placed them in a more detrimental position
than their opponents when litigating abroad. Federal courts
were required to determine whether and to what extent to grant
discovery requests while foreign tribunals were asked not to interfere. In light of the Court's interpretation of § 1782(a), the
legislature may be compelled to amend the statute by incorporating into § 1782(a) a foreign discoverability requirement to
provide more protection for U.S. litigants, and require federal
courts to give deference to the opinions of foreign tribunals to
further encourage foreign countries to pass similar statutes.

228 Assigning the task of maintaining parity to federal courts only will remove
the burden on a foreign tribunal to choose between its own laws and maintaining
parity among the parties.
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